package briolette.tokenmap

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• rpc Archive (ArchiveRequest, ArchiveReply)

  tokenmap.proto:28

  Removes a token's revocation from being returned with Fetch.

  message ArchiveRequest

  tokenmap.proto:94

  This is called to archive a revocation, by token base signature

  • bytes id = 1

  message ArchiveReply

  tokenmap.proto:97

  (message has no fields)

• rpc RevocationData (RevocationDataRequest, RevocationDataReply)

  tokenmap.proto:26

  Returns all non-archived abused tokens

  message RevocationDataRequest

  tokenmap.proto:43

  • oneof select

    • SelectGroup group = 1

    • bytes id = 2

  message RevocationDataReply

  tokenmap.proto:88

  • repeated RevocationDataEntry entries = 1

    Returns all unarchived revocations.

• rpc StoreTickets (StoreTicketsRequest, StoreTicketsReply)

  tokenmap.proto:24

  Store ticket<>NAC and NAC<>group mappings for Clerk

  message StoreTicketsRequest

  tokenmap.proto:31

  • repeated token.SignedTicket tickets = 1

    Contains groups and the TTC credential

  • optional LinkableSignature nac = 2

    The signature over all the ticket requests

  message StoreTicketsReply

  tokenmap.proto:37

  (message has no fields)

• rpc Update (UpdateRequest, UpdateReply)

  tokenmap.proto:22

  Creates or updates an existing entry if needed.

  message UpdateRequest

  tokenmap.proto:101

  • bytes id = 1

  • optional token.Token token = 2

  message UpdateReply

  tokenmap.proto:108

  If an abuse is detected, Tokenmap will create a RevocationData entry but just return that abuse was uncovered on the update.

  • bool created = 1

    true on first seen

  • bool abuse_detected = 2

Used in: Entry

• uint64 discovery_timestamp = 1

• uint32 token_index = 2

  against which stored token

• uint32 history_index = 3

  in the indicated token

• AbuseType abuse_type = 4

Used in: Abuse, RevocationData

• DOUBLE_SPEND = 0

  token spent twice from the same node

• GENEROUS_SPLIT = 1

  token splits add up to more than the original token value

• TOKEN_HISTORY_TOO_LONG = 2

  hw fails to enforce maximum transfer limit

• TICKET_TRANSFER_AMOUNT_EXCEEDED = 3

  All transfers by a single ticket exceed its policy amount

• bytes id = 1

  Usually the signature of the base.

• repeated token.Token tokens = 2

  Each entry should represent histories which do not merge. If a token splits, then multiple histories are possible. However, if there is no split, it indicates double spending.

• repeated Abuse abuses = 3

• uint64 last_update = 4

Used in: RevocationData

• uint32 number = 1

• uint64 expiration = 2

Used in: RevocationData, StoreTicketsRequest

• bytes signature = 1

  TODO: wrap in crypto::v0 -> ecdaa_signature_FP256_get_pseudonym

  extract the pseudonym (sig->K) for bsn revocation

• bytes basename = 2

  enables easy re-forced signing

• bytes group_public_key = 3

  this can be stored more efficiently later.

Created during an Update when double spending is detected.

Used in: RevocationDataEntry

• uint64 timestamp = 1

  Time when the abuse was discovered.

• optional LinkableSignature nac = 2

  The NAC linkable signature comes from the ticket request associated with the abusive credential.

• optional LinkableSignature ttc = 3

  The TTC linkable signature comes from the double spend signature in the token.Transfer.

• bytes token_id = 4

  Signature of the Token.base

  All servers should keep a revoked token list even if wallets don't.

• uint64 token_expiry = 5

  The tokens' hard expiration.

• repeated Group groups = 6

  For every impacted group, include the number and when the last ticket for the given NAC issuer expires.

• AbuseType abuse = 7

  Cause of the revocation

Used in: RevocationDataReply

• bytes id = 1

  token base signature

• optional RevocationData data = 2

• uint64 created_on = 3

Used in: RevocationDataRequest

• ALL = 0