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* Returns an X.509 certificate created by the Fulcio certificate authority for the given request parameters
Identity information about who possesses the private / public key pair presented
The public key to be stored in the requested certificate along with a signed challenge as proof of possession of the private key.
PKCS#10 PEM-encoded certificate signing request Contains the public key to be stored in the requested certificate. All other CSR fields are ignored. Since the CSR is self-signed, it also acts as a proof of posession of the private key.
* Returns the bundle of certificates that can be used to validate code signing certificates issued by this Fulcio instance
This is created for forward compatibility in case we want to add fields to the TrustBundle service in the future
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The set of PEM-encoded certificate chains for this Fulcio instance; each chain will start with any intermediate certificates (if present), finishing with the root certificate.
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The PEM-encoded certificate chain, ordered from leaf to intermediate to root as applicable.
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The OIDC token that identifies the caller
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The cryptographic algorithm to use with the key material
PKIX, ASN.1 DER or PEM-encoded public key. PEM is typically of type PUBLIC KEY.
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The public key to be stored in the requested certificate
Proof that the client possesses the private key; must be verifiable by provided public key This is a currently a signature over the `sub` claim from the OIDC identity token
(-- api-linter: core::0142::time-field-type=disabled aip.dev/not-precedent: SCT is defined in RFC6962 and we keep the name consistent for easier understanding. --)
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The certificate chain serialized with the leaf certificate first, followed by all intermediate certificates (if present), finishing with the root certificate. All values are PEM-encoded certificates.
The signed certificate timestamp is a promise for including the certificate in a certificate transparency log. It can be "stapled" to verify the inclusion of a certificate in the log in an offline fashion.
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The certificate chain serialized with the leaf certificate first, followed by all intermediate certificates (if present), finishing with the root certificate. All values are PEM-encoded certificates.